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THE COURT OF APPEALS 1952-53 TERM
subdivision 14 of § 61 Public Service Law "23 Heating: Each
omnibus shall be heated when reasonably required for the comfort and safety of passengers." Furthermore, the court stated
that it is common knowledge that many people suffer from low
blood pressure and poor circulation.
Negligence has been defined as "any conduct, except conduct
recklessly disregardful of an interest of others, which falls below
the standard established by law for the protection of others
against an unreasonable risk of harm."" The standard-of conduct which an actor is held to i that which an ordinary prudent
person would use under the circumstances i. e. reasonable care.2 8
As a general proposition, an actor's liability for negligence is
based upon the foreseeability of any harm resulting from the careless conduct."
Once the negligent conduct of the defendant is established, it
it well settled that an injured person can recover for all the harm
actually suffered. 0 Thus a defendant is liable for the consequences
of a negligent act, even if those consequences are more severe or
aggravated by a delicate condition of health.81
While the court merely applied general rules of negligence
in reaching the above result, the rationale behind the decision is
not very clear. Perhaps the court is arguing that since plaintiff
was considered a normal person, defendant's conduct was negligent because it created an unreasonable risk to such an average
person.3 2 Inasmuch as it is "common knowledge" that many people have poor circulation, the rationale may be that the frequency
of the occurrence of the abnormality is high enough to impose a
duty of care in regard to it.
Vicarious Tort Liability
The true basis of vicarious liability, where one person is held
liable for the acts of another, is said to be one of policy. 33 A deliberate allocation of a risk is involved when the losses caused by
a servant are placed upon the master, because he is better able to
bear them and to distribute the costs.' 27. RESTATEmEN,
ToRTs § 282.
28. See Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HAzv. L. REv. 72, 88 (1942).
29. Poplar v. Bourjois Inc., 298 N. Y. 62, 67, 80 N:E. 2d 334, 336 (1948).
30. Poplarv. Bourfois Inc., supra note 29; See 1 COOLEY, ToRzs 140-141 (4th Ed.
19.32).
31. McCahill v. New York Transpor.ation Co., 201 N. Y. 221, 94 N. E. 616
(1911); Tice v. Munn, 94 N. Y. 621 (1883); See PRossn, Tots 344.
32. See note 26 supra.
33. PNossa, To rs § 62.
34. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yk=. L. J. 106 (1916); Douglas,
Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L J. 106 (1916); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administrationof Risk, 38 YALE L J. 584, 720 (1929).
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Vicarious liability applies to acts done within the "scope of
the employment." 3 5 While this is a very vague concept,8 it has
been said that in general, "the servant's conduct is within the
scope of his employment if it is of the kind which he is employed
to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of
time and space, and is actuated at least in part by a purpose to
serve the master." 3 7 However, the master is absolved from liability where the servant steps outside the employment to do some
act for himself not connected with the master's business.' Furthermore, if the servant has no intention, at least in part, to perform any service for his employer, but only to further a personal
end, his act is not within the scope of his employment 9
In Sauter v. New York Tribune Inc.,'0 a truck, controlled by
defendant and operated by its servant, struck plaintiff's bus.
Whin plaintiff asked the driver of the truck for his license, the
driver refused and struck him. Later, while plaintiff was attempting to copy the license number of the truck from the tailgate, defendant's servant kicked him in the face, inflicting the injuries
complained of.
The majority of" the court reasoned that at the time of the
second assault, the defendant's servant had abandoned any efforts
to exchange license numbers. This second assault therefore constituted a wilful departure from the employer's business as it
was not intended to benefit the master and was a refusal to act as
impliedly directed by the employer. Since the act of the driver
was not within the scope of his employment, the complaint was
dismissed.
Judge Dye, who dissented, argued that the exchange of information upon the happening of an accident is an integral part of
the operation of a truck.4 1 Even though the driver was not hired
to commit an assault, he was not authorized to refuse to do a required act. Hence the imperfect performance of the duty to submit credentials should not have absolved the master from liability.
Since no precise rule can be laid down as to when an employee 's act is within his employment, each case must be resolved
according to its peculiar facts.
35. Mott v. Consumer's Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543 (1878); Rounds v. Delaware L. and
WV.RR. Co.- 64 N. Y. 129 (1876).
36. SeeMEECHEML, OuTrxNqs o' AGEMCY 246 (19521.
37. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, § 228 (1933); PROSSEP, ToTS 476.
38. Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586, 108 N. E. 853 (1915).
39. Salomone 2Y. Yellow Taxi Corp., 242 N. Y. 251, 151 N. E. 442 (1926) ; Bene-

vento v. Poertner Motor Car Co., 235 N. Y. 123, 139 N. E. 213 (1923) ; Mort v. Consumer's Ice Co.. suPra note 35.

40. 305 N. Y. 442, 113 N. F_. 2d 790 (1953).
41. N .Y. VEHICLE AND TRAmC LAW § 70 (5a).

